In the spring of 2010 the sail training vessel Concordia was capsized and lost off the coast of Brazil. The crew was rescued and the blame was fixed on an unforeseeable microburst. The Canadian Transport Safety Board has now issued a report covering the incident, which makes for interesting reading.
A couple of points we take away from a quick perusal.
- Concordia was probably shy of ultimate stability.
- The data on wind strength indicates at most 50 knots of breeze, nothing like a true micro burst, and more in keeping with a squall in the tropics.
- Open ports/doors on the lee side allowed downflooding, which doomed the vessel (side opening doors and windows are a poor choice on seagoing vessels).
- In our opinion this was the result of poor seamanship (the aforementioned openings, lack of action to change course down wind or shorten sail early on).
The full report can be read here.
Posted by Steve Dashew (October 14, 2011)
October 14th, 2011 at 1:43 pm
general consensus among the experienced sail trainer folks I’ve spoken with casually about the incident and the report concurs with your conclusions. The data in the report relating to stability booklet requirements and the lack of training required worldwide for sail training vessel officers – while perhaps factually true – does not appear to have been a real factor in this case. Much was made out of this by media outlets, but seems to have been missing the real point. It looks, for all intents and purposes, as if the boat was literally just sailed underwater. had those hatches/vents/ports been closed and downflooding not occurred, then the outcome would likely have been very different. Seamanship, prudence and attention…
October 14th, 2011 at 1:55 pm
I heard an interesting take on this particular case the other day. Paraphrased, it is as follows:
The premise is that, in the age of commercial sail, society had a very different tolerance for risk than we do today. It was taken for granted that crew would be lost on a long voyage. It was assumed that some ships would disappear, never to be found. Today, it’s not acceptable to lose a ship; we’ve charted the harbours and we model the expected weather many days in advance. And it’s certainly not acceptable to lose crew at sea; a board of inquiry is struck if you do.
So when we go to sea on ships whose basic design is of an earlier, riskier era, we must do one of two things: either anticipate and accept vastly greater risks in every aspect of the voyage, or take far more extreme precautions than we are accustomed to in order to bring those risks down to a modern, acceptable level.
The report indicates that she was reefed, at the time of the incident, to a sail plan the master thought was good for 40 knots despite being in about 20-25 kt apparent right before the incident, and the 2/O tried to turn the ship downwind as the apparent wind rapidly increased and shifted forward. By the time the rudder actually went hard-over, the bridge wing was almost in the water. Having so many ports and hatches open was, I agree, a very bad idea. But I’m not sure it’s fair to fault the choice of sail plan or the second officer’s actions at the helm, at least based on what I see in the report.
October 15th, 2011 at 12:22 pm
A couple of observations:
having some doors and ports open in decent weather conditions is a good thing (refreshing breeze and such), but the watch officer knew he was about to intercept a squall and with plenty of man power to batten down, still they remained open, poor seamanship.
The watch officer’s lack of understanding his autopilot limits, ditto.
The watch officer did not call out the master until it was too late, unforgivably ditto.